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Abstract: The constitution confers on the legislative arm of 
government impeachment power and prescribes when and how 
it should be exercised. Disputes arising from the exercise of this 
power are submitted to the courts for adjudication in line with their 
inherent powers. The issue of compliance with these constitutional 
requirements is a cause for concern as most of the impeachment 
proceedings conducted so far in Nigeria had been challenged in 
court for noncompliance. The question is, could this role played 
by the Nigerian courts ensure compliance? The objective of this 
paper is, therefore, to determine whether the courts could ensure 
compliance with the constitutional requirement for impeachment. In 
order to achieve the objective of this paper, doctrinal methodology 
is used whereby relevant materials were analyzed and conclusion 
made. The result showed that the role played by the courts cannot 
ensure compliance with the constitutional requirements because 
the courts only intervene after the conclusion of the exercise due 
to disrespect to court orders from the legislature. This is largely 
due to lack of specific role conferred on the courts in impeachment 
proceedings. It is, therefore, recommended that the constitution be 
amended to vest on the Supreme Court the specific role of ensuring 
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that all the constitutional requirements for impeachment have been 
duly complied with before a public officer is removed. 





The Nigerian constitution vests on the legislature some powers 
under the constitutional democracy it operates. One of such powers 
is impeachment1which, in a simpler way, is the act by the legislature 
calling for the removal of public officials which is accomplished 
by presenting a written charge of the official’s alleged misconduct.2 
The constitution also makes provisions on when and how the power 
is to be exercised3 failing which the exercise becomes null and 
void4 because impeachment is considered as a serious business.5 
Impeachment in Nigeria, like in other jurisdictions across the globe, 
is a constitutional requirement. Therefore, the constitution makes 
an elaborate provision on its requirements which the legislature is 
expected to strictly comply with in the course of its exercise. The 
constitution also makes provisions for the subjects of impeachment; 
who initiates it and how; the manner and the grounds upon which 
it is to be conducted and by whom. All these are requirements of 
the constitution which must be strictly observed for impeachment to 
be legal. Any infraction, breach or violation of these constitutional 
requirements is not only frowned at but also results in voiding the 
entire exercise. This is in line with the legal principle on the legal 
position of an act which is void as enunciated by the legendary Lord 
1 The legislature at the federal level has the power to impeach the President and 
the Vice President while the legislature at the state level are empowered to 
impeach the state Governor and the Deputy Governor. See sections 143 and 188 
of the constitution and Attorney General of the Federation vs. Abubakar (2007) 
All FWLR 375, 407.
2 Garner Bryan, Black’s Law Dictionary (St. Paul, Minn: West Publishing Co., 
2009) 678.
3  See sections 143 and 188 of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
1999 (as amended).
4 Shikyl, S. ‘Constitutional Designs and Justiciability of Impeachment under the 
1999 Nigerian Constitution’ (2007) 2 Nigerian Journal of Legislative Affairs, 
28.
5 Inakoju v Adeleke (2007) NWLR 1 at 123
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Denning which is worth quoting here. He said in the celebrated case 
of Benjamin Leornard Macfoy vs. United Africa Company Ltd that:
…If an act is void, then it is in law a nullity. It is not only 
bad but incurably bad. There is no need for an order of 
court to set it aside. It is automatically null and void 
without more ado, though it is sometime convenient to 
have the court declare it to be so. And every proceeding 
which is founded on it is also bad and incurably bad. 
You cannot put something on nothing and expect it to 
stay there. It will collapse…6 
In the light of the above judicial pronouncement, any impeachment 
built on illegality and noncompliance with constitutional requirements 
will surely collapse. This is because it has been the responsibility of 
the courts to ensure that the laid down provisions of the constitution 
have always been complied with.7 Therefore, the judiciary acts as 
a watchdog over the other organs of government and ensures their 
fidelity to supremacy of the Constitution.8 This makes it an essential 
organ which balances the exercise of powers in the political entity 
of any nation among its organs of the government.9 The question 
here is could the role played by courts ensure compliance with the 
constitutional requirements? Therefore, the objective is to determine 
whether the role played by courts is capable of ensuring compliance 
with the constitutional requirements for impeachment. Doctrinal 
methodology is used whereby materials relevant to the research 
were analyzed in order to achieve the stated objective.
6 Benjamin Leornard Macfoy v United Africa Company Ltd. (1962) AC 150 at 
160.
7 I.T. Mohammad (2012) “Judicialism and Electoral Processes in Nigeria: What 
the Supreme Court Did; What the Supreme Court May Do”, being a paper 
presented at the 2012 Felix Okoye Memorial Lecture, Organized by Nigerian 
Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, University of Lagos, held at the Nigerian 
Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, University of Lagos, on 18th September 
2012.
8 Imo John ‘The Power of Judicial Review in the Promotion of Constitutionalism 
in Nigeria: Challenges and Prospects’ (2015) 40 Journal of Law, Policy and 
Globalization, 192-205.
9 Egbewole Wahab ‘Nigerian Judiciary and Consolidation of Democracy: 
Analysis of Election Petitions’ in Olarinde O. N and Wale Akinlabi Jr. (eds), 
Essays and Selected Judgment in Honour of an Incorruptible Judge, Hon. 
Justice John Olagoke Ige , (Ibadan: Crown Goldmine Communication Ltd, 
2008) 67.
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IMPEACHMENT AS MECHANISM FOR CHECKS AND 
BALANCES
First and foremost, impeachment is intended to function as an 
instrument to check the excesses of the executive and in some 
dominions even the judicial arm of government10. This is on 
the basis of the principle of separation of powers which defends 
the society from impunity by any arm of government and makes 
certain that each arm preserves its own sphere of influence.11 So, 
the judiciary checks the exercise of powers by both the executive 
and the legislature by way of judicial review to guarantee that 
they function within their scopes as provided by the constitution.12 
The executive, on the other hand, exercises some level of power 
over the judiciary in terms of appointment and discipline and over 
the legislature in cases of endorsement of legislations13 and fiscal 
expenditure. The legislature also checks the judiciary in terms of 
endorsement of their appointment and financial expenditure14 while 
the executive is exposed to the control of the legislative assembly 
in cases of some appointments, expenditure and impeachment for 
misconduct. Therefore, impeachment is machinery meant to check 
the excesses in the exercise of the executive powers.15
Having checked the excesses of the office holders as discussed 
above, impeachment additionally affords an opportunity to hold 
them responsible for the misconducts they committed while in office. 
In many jurisdictions that practice democracy across the globe, the 
President, Vice President and other members of the executive at the 
various levels of government enjoy legal protection from suits for 
their acts or omissions during the period they occupy the particular 
offices. This makes all their actions and omissions immune from 
accountability which is a cardinal element in governance. In Nigeria, 
for instance, the President, Vice President, Governor and Deputy 
 
10 Section 6 (6) of the Constitution of Nigeria; Adesanya v President of Nigeria 
(1982) 2 NCLR 356.
11    Obiora Chukura and Chukwuemeka, Melachy ‘Constitutionalism, Impeachment 
and Democracy in Nigeria: An Appraisal’ (2012) 12 Journal of Constitutional 
Development, 44-45.
12 See section 6 of the Constitution of Nigeria.
13 National Assembly v The President of Federal Republic of Nigeria (2003) 41 
WRN 94; Mowoe Kehinde Constitutional Law in Nigeria, (Lagos: Mathouse 
Press Ltd.,2008) 26.
14 Sections 80-84 of the constitution of Nigeria.
15 Mowoe, Constitutional Law in Nigeria, op cit. 26.
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Governor enjoy such legal protection. The constitution provides 
thus:
 
1. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this 
Constitution, but subject to subsection (2) of this 
section-
 a. no civil or criminal proceedings shall be instituted  
 or continued against a person to whom this  
 section applies during his period of office;
 b. a person to whom this section applies shall not be  
 arrested or imprisoned during that period either in  
 pursuance of the process of any court or otherwise;  
 and
 c. no process of any court requiring or compelling  
 the appearance of a person to whom this section  
 applies, shall be applied for or issued:
 Provided that in ascertaining whether any period 
of limitation has expired for the purposes of any 
proceedings against a person to whom this section 
applies, no account shall be taken of his period of 
office.
2.   The provisions of subsection (1) of this section shall 
not apply to civil proceedings against a person to 
whom this section applies in his official capacity 
or to civil or criminal proceedings in which such a 
person is only a nominal party.
3.  This section applies to a person holding the office 
of President or Vice-President, Governor or Deputy 
Governor; and the reference in this section to 
“period of office” is a reference to the period during 
which the person holding such office is required to 
perform the functions of the office.16
This is immunity from legal proceedings which elected executive 
office holders who may be subjected to impeachment enjoy while in 
office.17 Therefore, impeachment presents itself as the only way to 
16 See section 308 of the constitution of Nigeria.
17  The concept of Immunity under the Nigerian constitution had received so much 
judicial interpretation in a lot of pronouncements from the Nigerian superior 
courts. See for instance the cases of Tinubu v I.M.B. Securities Plc (2001) All 
FWLR (pt.77) 1003; Alameyeseigha v Yeiwa (2002) All FWLR (t. 96) 552; 
Media Tech Nig. Ltd., v Lam Adesina (2005) 1 (t. 908) 461; I C S Nig. Ltd. v 
Balton B. V.(2003) 8 NWLR (t.  822) 223; Umnah v Attah (2004) 7 (t. 871) 
6
UUMJLS 10(1) Jan 2019 (1-24)
call elected executives to account for their wrongdoings in Nigeria 
during the pendency of their offices.
OUTLINE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
FOR IMPEACHMENT 
The constitution makes elaborate provision on the grounds and the 
procedure for impeachment. For instance, section 188 provides:
(1)The Governor or Deputy Governor may be removed 
from office in accordance with the provisions of this 
section.
(2) Whenever a notice of allegation in writing signed 
by not less than one-third of the members of the 
House of Assembly-
 (a) is presented to the speaker of the House of  
       Assembly of the state;
 (b) stating that the holder of such office is guilty   
 of gross misconduct in the performance of the  
 functions of his office, details particulars of  
 which shall be specified, the Speaker of the  
 House of Assembly shall, within seven days of  
 the receipt of the notice, cause a copy of the  
 notice to be served on the holder of the office  
 and on each member of the House of Assembly,  
 and shall also cause any statement made in reply  
 to the allegation by the holder of the office, to be  
 served on each member of the House of  
 Assembly.
(3) within fourteen days of the presentation of the 
notice to the Speaker of the House of Assembly 
(whether or not any statement was made by the 
holder of the office in reply to the allegation 
contained in the notice), the House of Assembly 
shall resolve by motion, without any debate 
whether or not the allegation shall be investigated. 
63; Alameiyeseigha v Federal Republic of Nigeria (2006) 16 (t. 1004) 1; Gani 
Fawehinmi v Inspector General of Police (2002) All FWLR (t. 108); Global 
Excellence Communication Ltd. v Mr Donald Duke (2007) 16 NWLR (t. 1059) 
22.
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(4) A motion of the House of Assembly that the 
allegation be investigated shall not be declared as 
having been passed unless it is supported by the 
votes of not less than two-third majority of all the 
members of the Hose of Assembly.
(5) within seven days of the passing of the motion under 
the foregoing provisions of this section, the Chief 
judge of the state shall, at the request of the speaker 
of the House of Assembly, appoint a panel of seven 
persons who in his opinion are of unquestionable 
integrity, not being members of any public service, 
legislative house or political party, to investigate the 
allegation as provided in this section.
(6) The holder of an office whose conduct is being 
investigated under this section shall have the right 
to defend himself in person or be represented before 
the panel by a legal practitioner of his own choice.
(7) A panel appointed under this section shall
 (a) have such powers and exercise its functions  
  in accordance with such procedure as may be  
   prescribed by the House of Assembly; and 
 (b) within three months of its appointment, report  
   its findings to the House of Assembly.
(8) Where the panel reports to the House of assembly  
that the allegation has not been proved, no further 
proceedings shall be taken in respect of the matter.
(9) where the report of the panel is that the allegation 
against the holder has been proved, then within 
fourteen days of the receipt of the report, the House 
of assembly shall consider the report, and if by the 
resolution of the House of Assembly supported by 
not less than two-thirds majority of all its members, 
the report of the panel is adopted, then the holder of 
the office shall stand removed from office as from 
the date of the adoption of the report.
(10) No proceedings or determination of the panel or of 
the House of Assembly or any matter relating to such 
proceedings or determination shall be entertained or 
questioned in any court.
(11)In this section “gross misconduct” means a 
grave violation or breach of the provisions of the 
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constitution or  a misconduct of such a nature as 
amounts in the opinion of the house of Assembly to 
gross misconduct.18 
Thus, in view of the above constitutional provisions, the requirement 
for impeachment is both substantive and procedural. As for the 
substantive requirements, the impeachment power could only be 
exercised on the grounds that the office holder has committed gross 
misconduct in the exercise of his official responsibility. The existence 
of those grounds is what actually triggers the commencement of 
impeachment proceedings. Furthermore, it is the proof of those 
grounds that gives rise to successful result of impeachment which 
culminates in the removal of the public officer involved. Thus, the 
ground for impeachment under the Nigerian constitution is gross 
misconduct.19 Gross misconduct, as provided under the constitution, 
means grave violation of the constitution or any misconduct 
considered by the legislature to be gross misconduct.20 Based on 
this, there are two categories of misconducts for the purpose of 
impeachment. They are grave violation of the constitution and any 
misconduct which the legislature considers as gross misconduct. 
For the first category, so many violations of the constitution were 
considered as gross misconducts sufficient to justify impeachment. 
Therefore, in an attempt to provide an insight into the nature of 
constitutional breaches that could justify impeachment, the Supreme 
Court recognized the following violations. The court said:  
The following, in my view, constitute grave violation 
or breach of the Constitution: (a) Interference with 
the constitutional functions of the Legislature and the 
judiciary by an exhibition of overt unconstitutional 
executive power, (b) Abuse of the fiscal provisions of  
18 Similar provisions apply in the case of the President and Vice President mutati 
mutandis (with some necessary changes). See section 143 of the constitution.
19 The President, Vice President, Governor or Deputy Governor may be removed 
from office on the ground that he was found guilty of gross misconduct. See 
section 143 (2) (b) and 188 (2) (b) of the constitution.
20 See sections 143 (10) and 188 (10) of the constitution of Nigeria. The Supreme 
Court provided an insight into what could mean gross. The court, per Niki Tobi 
JSC said: The word “gross” in section 188(11) of the 1999 Constitution means 
generally in the context atrocious, colossal, deplorable, disgusting, dreadful, 
enormous, gigantic, grave, heinous, outrageous, odious and shocking. Inakoju 
v Adeleke (2007) LPELR 10354.
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the Constitution, (c) Abuse of the Code of Conduct for 
Public Officers (d) Disregard and breach of Chapter 
IV of the Constitution on fundamental rights, (e) 
Interference with Local Government funds and stealing 
from the funds or pilfering of the funds including 
monthly subventions for personal gains or for the 
comfort and advantage of the State Government, (f) 
Instigation of military rule and military government, 
(g) Any other subversive conduct which is directly or 
indirectly inimical to the implementation of some other 
major sectors of the Constitution.21
These are some of the constitutional violations that could warrant 
impeachment under the Nigerian constitution as opined by the 
 
learned justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria. Although this 
may not be the law, since it is a mere expression of opinion, but it 
could go a long way in guiding the lawmakers in the determination 
of what constitutes violation of the constitution as a ground for 
impeachment.
The other aspect of gross misconduct under the constitution as a 
ground of impeachment is that whatever the legislature consider 
as gross misconduct. This is very nebulous provision in that the 
legislature has the discretion to term whatever conduct as gross. 
However, the learned justice of the Supreme Court gave an opinion as 
to guide the legislature on what may be regarded as gross misconduct 
for the purpose of impeachment. These misconducts include refusal 
to perform constitutional function, corruption, sexual harassment, 
certificate forgery and drunkenness.22 
As for the procedural requirements of impeachment, three main 
stages are involved. First is the presentation of the notice of allegation 
of gross misconduct to the substantive or acting Speaker of the 
House of Assembly in case of the impeachment of the Governor 
or Deputy Governor. In case of the impeachment of the President 
or Vice President, such notice is to be presented to the substantive 
or acting President of the Senate. The substantive or acting Speaker 
or President of the Senate shall serve it, within seven days of its 
21 Inakoju vs Adeleke  (2007) LPELR 10354.
22  Ibid.
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receipt, on all members of the Assembly and the office holder to be 
subjected to the impeachment.23 This affords the members of the 
Assembly especially who were not part of the preparation of the 
allegations the opportunity to know the gross misconduct alleged. 
The object of the service of this notice is also to give information on 
the case against the Governor or Deputy Governor, as the case may 
be, and enable him to start preparation for his defense.24 This is why 
he is required to be served the notice personally.25 After the service, 
the members of the Assembly are required to pass a resolution, by 
the two-third majority votes of the total number of the members of 
the Assembly on whether to investigate the allegations.  
The next stage is the appointment of the investigation panel. In case 
of the impeachment of President or Vice President, the constitution 
requires that the Senate President should request the Chief Justice of 
Nigeria to appoint the impeachment panel. In the impeachment of the 
Governor or Deputy Governor of a state, the Speaker of the House 
of Assembly concerned, on the other hand, is required to request the 
Chief Judge of the state to set up such panel.26 Such appointment 
should be made within seven days of the receipt of the request in that 
regards. It follows, therefrom, that no any member of the Assembly 
other than the Speaker, or the Senate President, could perform the 
function of requesting the Chief Judge or Chief Justice of Nigeria to 
appoint the impeachment panel.27 For the Chief Judge to qualify to 
perform this job, he should be one who is lawfully appointed as such 
either in a substantive or acting capacity. However, a substantive or 
acting Chief Judge who has been illegally appointed in that capacity 
cannot so act.28
The last stage is that impeachment panel is required to prepare and 
submit to the Speaker of the House of Assembly or the Senate President 
the report of its findings within three months. Although there is no 
particular format prescribed for the report, but the constitution says 
that it should state whether the allegations of the gross misconduct 
23 Same applies where the President or Vice President is the subject of the 
impeachment.
24 Mbenwulu v Olumba (2017) 5 NWLR (t. 1558) 169 SC.
25 See the cases of Nyako v Adamawa State House of Assembly (2017) 6 NWLR 
(pt. 1560) 347-424. 
26  See section 188 (5) of the constitution of Nigeria
27  Hon. Micheal Dapialong & Ors v Chief Joshua Dariye & Ors (2007) NWLR 
28  See the case of All Progressive Congress v Peoples Democratic Party (2015) 
 15     NWLR (pt. 1581) 1-204. 
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as the grounds of impeachment labeled against the Governor or 
Deputy Governor have been proved or not. The report should not 
be interim but final of the findings of the impeachment panel. This 
means it should be one prepared after the final proceedings of the 
impeachment panel.29 Where the allegations have not been proved, 
that ends the procedure and the matter at all. This means that no 
any impeachment proceedings could again be instituted against the 
same President or Vice President and Governor or Deputy Governor 
in respect of the same allegations of gross misconduct. Thus, the 
constitution says: “Where the Panel reports to each House of the 
National Assembly that the allegation has not been proved, no 
further proceedings shall be taken in respect of the matter.30 But this 
does not mean no more impeachment proceedings could again be 
instituted against the same President or Vice President and Governor 
or Deputy Governor before the end of his/her tenure. He/she could 
still be subjected to impeachment when there are fresh allegations 
of gross misconduct against him/her. However, where the report 
of the panel is that the allegations of gross misconduct against the 
President or Vice President and the Governor or Deputy Governor 
have been proved, then such report is subject to the discretion of the 
members of the National Assembly or House of Assembly to adopt 
or refuse to adopt. The constitution makes provision for numerical 
strength of the members eligible to adopt or endorse or approve the 
report of the impeachment panel. In this regards, the constitution 
says in respect of the Governor and Deputy Governor:
Where the report of the Panel is that the allegation 
against the holder of the office has been proved, then 
within fourteen days of the receipt of the report, the 
House of Assembly shall consider the report, and if by 
a resolution of the House of Assembly supported by 
not less than two-thirds majority of all its members, the 
report of the Panel is adopted, then the holder of the 
office shall stand removed from office as from the date 
of the adoption of the report.31
29   Sani Abubakar Danladi v Nasiru Audu Dangiri (2015)2 NWLR (pt.1442) 
 124.
30 Section 143 (8) of the constitution of Nigeria. A similar provision could also be 
found in section188 (8) of the constitution. See also the case of All Progressive 
Congress v Peoples Democratic Party (2015) 15 NWLR (pt. 1581) 1-204.
31  See section 188 (9) of the constitution of Nigeria.
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The requirement is that two-third of the total number of the members 
of the House of Assembly  is to adopt the report of the impeachment 
panel which shows that the allegations of gross misconduct against 
the President or Vice President and Governor or Deputy Governor 
have been proved. The question here is does the two-third include 
members who are suspended or who are unavoidably absent at the 
House of Assembly session for the purpose of the impeachment? 
The judicial interpretation given to this requirement is that two-third 
of all members of the House of Assembly including those who are 
absent during the plenary session and those suspended or no longer 
eligible to participate in the activities of the House of Assembly 
for some justifiable reasons.32 It follows, therefrom, that no any 
advantage could be derived from the manipulation of the required 
number of the members through unlawful suspension of members 
who are opposed to impeachment moves.  Where the report of the 
impeachment panel is adopted by the required two-third of the total 
number of the members of the House of Assembly, the Governor or 
Deputy Governor becomes removed from the date of its adoption.
NATURE OF COMPLIANCE WITH CONSTITUTIONAL 
REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPEACHMENT
The exercise of impeachment power by the Nigerian legislature 
is a cause for concern as it leaves much to be desired.33 Common 
problem to most cases of impeachment in Nigeria is noncompliance 
with the constitutional requirements34 which is becoming a recurring 
decimal35 and which draws the concern of well-meaning Nigerians, 
lawyers and laymen alike.36 In fact, the way the Nigerian legislature 
conducts impeachment proceedings is unbecoming, unfortunate 
and embarrassing, to say the least. This is despite the fact that 
32  See Dapialong v Dariye (2007) LPELR-SC.39/2007 and Adeleke v Oyo state 
House of Assembly (2006) 16 NWLR (pt.1006) 608 C.A.
33 Olafunmilayo Olopade, ‘The Gale of Impeachments in Nigeria: A Threat to 
Sustainable Democracy’, in Cross-cutting Issues in Nigerian Law: Essays in 
Honour of Funsho Adaramola, (Jamex Press, Lagos, 2009) 23.
34 Shikyl, op. cit. 1.
35 Lawal Mamman �Abuse of Powers of �mpeachment in Nigeria’ (2010) 4� Jour�-
nal of Modern African Studies, 314.
36 Akeredolu Ale The Supreme Court on Impeachment Proceedings, (St. Paul 
Publishing House, Ibadan, 2007) 2.
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the legislature is not left without any form of guidance in the 
exercise of this important power as shown earlier. Therefore, any 
failure to strictly observe these provisions will invariably render 
the exercise futile. This is more so as the compliance is expected 
from the legislative arm of the government which is regarded as 
the custodian of the constitution. Thus, reiterating the importance of 
compliance with the constitutional requirements by the legislature in 
the exercise of their powers including impeachment power and the 
likely consequences of failure to comply with the constitution in this 
direction, the Supreme Court said: 
The Legislature is the custodian of a country’s 
Constitution in the same way that the Executive is 
the custodian of the policy of Government and its  
execution, and also in the same way that the Judiciary  
is the custodian of the construction or interpretation 
of the Constitution. One major role of a custodian is 
to keep under lock and key the property under him so 
that it is not desecrated or abused. The legislature is 
expected to pet the provisions of the constitutions like 
the way the mother pet her day old baby. The legislature 
is expected to abide by the provision of the constitution 
like the way the clergyman abide by the bible and the 
imam abide by the Koran. Also, when the legislature, 
the custodian, is responsible for the desecration and 
abuse of the provision of the constitution in terms of 
patent violation and breach, society and its people are 
the victim and the sufferers…37
The exercise is also sometimes fraught with crises that result in 
physical combat among the lawmakers.38  As a result, impeachment 
is considered as one of the most troubling phenomenon39 and 
37 Niki Tobi JSC in Inakoju v Adeleke (supra) 123
38 Egobueze, Ana ‘Crisis and Crisis Management in the Legislature: The Rivers 
State House of Assembly Experience, 2011�2015’ (2015) 26 Scottish Journal of 
Arts, Social Sciences and Scientific Studies, 1; Olasupo Fatai ��mpeachment at 
the State Level in Nigeria: Osun State as a Case Studies’ (2015) 6 Beijing Law 
Review, 34.
39 �ncessant impeachment a blot on Nigeria’s democracy, Osun Defender, an 
online Nigerian newspaper, available at www.osundefenders.org accessed on 
11/10/2016
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engaging issue in the Nigerian constitutional history.40 Besides this, 
the exercise is also becoming so frequent that there is no state in 
Nigeria which has not experienced the threat, attempt or actual 
impeachment of Governor or Deputy Governor in Nigeria41 which 
is unparalleled in the history of any constitutional democracy.42 This 
makes a prominent law lord of the Nigerian Supreme Court, Niki 
Tobi JSC, to capture the situation in the following words:
The plethora of removal proceedings in respect of 
Governors is not only frightening but is capable of 
affecting the stability of Nigeria. It is almost like a 
child’s play as some State Legislatures indulge in it 
with all the ease and comfort like the way the English 
man sips his coffee on his breakfast table. Unless 
the situation is arrested, Nigerians will wake up one 
morning and look for where their country is. That 
should worry every good Nigerian. It does not only 
worry me; the idea frightens me so much.43
The result is that the exercise of impeachment powers by the 
Nigerian legislature is also mostly characterized by procedural 
irregularities. Evident to this is the fact that more than 90 per cent 
of the impeachment cases in Nigeria have been challenged in courts 
for procedural irregularities. In fact, there is so far no impeachment 
proceeding in which the issue of compliance with the constitutional 
requirements was not raised in Nigeria. In this light, it could be 
stated boldly that there is no constitutional requirement which had 
not been challenged for lack of compliance in court. In some cases, 
they were successfully challenged while in others they were not. 
Suffice it to state that the areas in which common noncompliance 
40 Jide, Olakanmi ‘Evaluation of Impeachment Proceedings under the Constitution 
 of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999’ Journal of Law, Policy and 
 Globalization, (2015) 34.
41 Oni Micheal Abioudun �Judicial Review of Governors Ladoja and Obi’s 
�mpeachment in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic’ (2013) 1 Singaporean Journal of 
Business Economics and Management Studies, 23.
42 Oni Ebenezer Oluwofe ‘The Challenges of Democratic Consolidation in 
Nigeria, 1999�2007’ (2014) 5 International Journal of Politics and Good 
Governance,21.
43  Inakoju v Adeleke (supra) 120.
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had been established successfully in courts are the requirements 
for quorum;44 the place and time to conduct legislative business in 
respect of impeachment proceedings;45 notice of allegations of gross 
misconduct46 and fair hearing before the investigation panel.47
 
 
THE ROLE OF COURTS IN ENSURING COMPLIANCE
Under the Nigerian constitution, there are established regular and 
special courts. The regular courts are those conferred with jurisdiction 
to entertain cases and matters for the determination of any question 
as to the civil rights and obligations of persons, government and 
 
authority in Nigeria.48 The special courts, on the other hand, are courts 
established on temporary or permanent basis and vested with the 
jurisdiction to deal with specific matters.49 The role which the courts 
play in impeachment is not more than that of judicial review50 which 
comes after the exercise had been concluded. Thus, where a party 
is aggrieved with the way and manner impeachment proceedings 
44 Dapialong v Dariye (2007) LPELR-SC.39/2007; Inakoju v Adeleke (supra).
45 Sani Abubakar Danladi v Nasiru Audu Dangiri (2015)2 NWLR (pt. 1442) 124; 
Dapialong v Dariye (2007) LPELR-SC.39/2007; Inakoju v Adeleke (supra).
46 Balonwu v Obi (2007) 5 NWLR (pt. 1028) 488 C.A.; Nyako v Adamawa State 
House of Assembly (2017) 6 NWLR (pt. 1560) 347-424.
47 Gadi v Male (2010) 7 NWLR (pt. 1193) 238; Sani Abubakar Danladi v Nasiru 
Audu Dangiri (2015)2 NWLR (pt. 1442) 124; Nyako v Adamawa State House 
of Assembly (2017) 6 NWLR (pt. 1560) 347-424.
48 Section 6 (6) (b) Constitution of Nigeria. Such courts include superior courts 
like the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal, Federal High Court, High Courts of 
states and the Federal Capital Territory, Sharia Court of Appeal of the states and 
the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, Customary Court of Appeal of states and 
that of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja and lower courts. 
49 The courts include Election Tribunals, Court Martial and Code of Conduct 
Tribunal. See sections 2�5 of the Constitution; fifth Schedule to the constitution, 
Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act, and Dr Bukola Saraki v Federal 
Government of Nigeria SC/852/2015, 5/2/2016; and section 143 of The Armed 
Forces Act, Cap A 20 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, and Major 
Dennis v Nigerian Army (2015) LPELR 25969 (CA) respectively.  
50 Judicial review has been described as the power of the court, in appropriate 
proceedings before it, to declare a legislative or executive act either contrary 
to, or in accordance with, the Constitution, with the effect of rendering the act 
invalid or vindicating its validity and so putting it beyond challenge in future. 
In other words, judicial review “entails judicial intervention in the exercise 
of powers by the other institutions of government and those who have been 
charged with the duties and authorities of those institutions…”
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have been conducted, he approaches the court for judicial review 
of the exercise. This is because adjudication on disputes between 
parties through the interpretation and application of the law is the 
major role of the judiciary.51 Therefore, disputes arising from the 
exercise of impeachment powers of the legislature are submitted 
to the regular courts for adjudication by the aggrieved party.52 By 
virtue of the provision of the constitution, which is the organic law 
in Nigeria, the judiciary has the prime duty to inquiry on whether 
the executive has acted intra vires or ultra vires or has conformed 
strictly to the procedure, mode or form set by law.53 The constitution 
also subjects the exercise of legislative power to the jurisdictions of 
court.54 By this provision, the official acts of the legislature could 
be subjected to judicial review by challenging its constitutionality 
before a competent court of law.
In view of the above, one of the earliest cases of impeachment 
submitted for judicial review was that of Alhaji Abdulkadir Balarabe 
Musa who was removed through impeachment as the first elected 
Governor of Kaduna state in 1981. The Governor had challenged, 
before the High Court of justice of Kaduna State and the Court of 
Appeal, various aspects of the procedure the Kaduna State House 
of Assembly followed in the impeachment. The courts declined to 
entertain his suits on the ground, among others, that impeachment 
proceedings were excluded from the jurisdictions of the court. This 
was premised on the ouster clause contained in the impeachment 
51 Dahiru Mustapher, (2011) The Nigerian Judiciary: Towards Reform of Bastion 
of Constitutional Democracy, Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 
Abuja, 7. Similarly, on the duty of the courts in relation to the interpretation 
of the law, Lord Denning once asserted that “the English Language is not an 
instrument of mathematical precision. Consequently, a judge should not be 
a mere mechanic in the power house of semantics. He should be the man in 
charge of it”. See Lord Denning in Seaford Court Estates Limited v Asher 
(1949) 2 K.B. 481 at 489-499; Lord Denning, The Discipline of Law (London: 
Butterworth, 1979) 56-57. See also Brown v Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953).
52 The Federal High Court and the High Court of states serve as courts of fi rst in�-
stance in disputes arising out of impeachments pursuant to their inherent juris-
dictions as provided under sections 251 and 272 of the constitution of Nigeria 
respectively.  
53 Benjamin Ogwo  “The Role of Law in Checkmating Executive Lawlessness in 
Nigeria from 1999-2014” (2015) 37 Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization, 
217.
54 Section 4(8) of the constitution
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provisions under the then constitution. This decision served as 
the locus classicus as far as jurisdiction of the Nigerian courts in 
impeachment proceedings is concerned. This is because the decision 
was followed strictly by the High Court of Abia State and the Court 
of Appeal, Enugu division some twenty years later in Abaribe vs. 
Abia State House of Assembly.55
In 2007, there was a paradigm shift in this judicial attitude towards 
jurisdiction in impeachment proceedings. This was following 
the Supreme Court’s liberal interpretation of the ouster clause56 
contained in the impeachment provisions under the constitution which 
hitherto served as one of the legal clogs in judicial intervention.57 
Justifying the decision, the court in Inakoju vs. Adeleke58 declared 
that “where the constitution has made a provision as to any particular 
procedure or mode of exercising any legislative function, if there is 
breach of such provisions, the court will assume jurisdiction as the 
guardians of the constitution, to intervene and ensure compliance 
with the provision of the constitution”.59 The duty of the court in this 
direction is to ensure that all the constitutional provisions regulating 
the exercise of the power of impeachment have been fully respected. 
Thus, the Supreme Court reiterated the role expected of the courts to 
perform in such cases when it stated:
�mpeachment of elected officials is a very serious matter 
and should not be conducted as a matter of course. 
The purpose is to set aside the will of the electorates 
as expressed at the polls. It has implication for the 
impeached as well as the electorates who bestowed the 
55 (2002) 14 NWLR (pt.788) 466.
56 Many cases of impeachment were declined by the courts on the basis, among 
others, of the ouster clause. See for instance; Balarabe Musa v Auta Hamza 
& Ors (1982) 3 NCLR 439; Abaribe v The Speaker, Abia State House of As-
sembly (2002) 14 NWLR (pt.788) 466.  Some scholars also opined that the 
courts were skeptical to intervene due to the doctrine of political question and 
the need to maintain a delicate balance between the judicial role and the work-
ing of other branches of government. See for instance, Popoola Abiodun “The 
Courts and the Democratic Process in Nigeria: An Appraisal of the Application 
of Some American Judicial Doctrines”, in Bello Ajibade (ed) Law, Democratic 
Governance and Justice Administration in Nigeria (Life Gate Publishing Co. 
Ltd., Ibadan, 2009) 275.
57 Inakoju vs. Adeleke (supra).
58 (supra)
59  Ibid, 144
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mandates on him. Whether it takes one day or the three 
months prescribed by law, the rules of due process 
must be followed. If the matter is left at the whims and 
caprices of politicians and their panels, a state or even 
the entire country could be reduced to the status of a 
banana republic the procedure for impeachment and 
removal must be guarded jealously by the courts.60
Considering the implication of impeachment as pointed out in the 
above judicial pronouncement by the apex court, “…it must be strictly 
and duly observed so as not to thwart the will of the electorates freely 
expressed at the polls”.61However, despite the judicial activism 
exhibited by the Supreme Court in the case of Inakoju vs. Adeleke62 
which resulted in the paradigm shift in the attitude of Nigerian courts 
to judicial review of impeachment cases, much is left to be desired. 
This is because the courts could only entertain complaints on the 
procedure for the exercise of impeachment powers. They could not 
determine whether the allegations of misconduct against the public 
officer concerned are gross to justify impeachment. This is the 
exclusive preserve of the legislature as provided in the constitution. 
This only role which the regular courts play may not be adequate 
to ensure compliance in the impeachment power of the legislature 
whose conducts make them like an “unruly horse”.
Furthermore, even the inadequate role of the regular courts by way of 
judicial review mostly comes at a time when the damage had already 
been done to the public officer who is the subject of the impeachment. 
This is because the courts have not been able to check the excesses 
of the legislature at the commencement or during the impeachment 
proceedings or so soon thereafter. In fact, it takes the courts between 
one and two years to finally dispose of impeachment disputes when 
the tenure of the public office holder subjected to the impeachment 
is about to end. In the worst cases, the impeachment proceedings 
which formed the basis of the removal were declared illegal and 
unconstitutional at the time when the tenure of the public officer had 
already expired! For instance, in the case of Nyako vs. Adamawa 
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state House of Assembly,63the impeachment of the Governor was 
finally affirmed as illegal and unconstitutional by the Supreme Court 
more than a year after the expiry of his tenure. Furthermore, the case 
of Danladi vs. Nasiru Abdu Dangiri64 is another impeachment case 
that readily comes to mind. The appellant, Sani Abubakar Danladi, 
was removed by impeachment as the Deputy Governor of Taraba 
State by the Taraba State House of Assembly on 4th October, 2012 
but the impeachment was finally declared illegal and unconstitutional 
on 21st November, 2014, after a period of more than two years and 
barely six months to the end of his four�year term of office. So many 
instances abound which expose the inadequacy of the regular court 
in ensuring compliance with the constitutional requirements for 
impeachment.
In most of these cases, the parties resorted to judicial review of 
impeachment because the courts were rendered virtually handicapped 
to ensure compliance during the pendency of the impeachment 
proceedings because courts’  intervention  by way of order were not 
respected as such the lawmakers went ahead with the impeachment 
in the face of apparent noncompliance with the requirements. Thus, 
most efforts by the courts to ensure that there is compliance during the 
exercise of impeachment power had been thwarted by not respecting 
court orders giving directions as to what and how to go about it. 
Court orders once given must be respected otherwise the authority 
and administration of the court will be brought into disrepute, scorn 
or disrespect.65 In the same vein, “The court is gradually beginning 
to lose its integrity as a result of flagrant disregard of its orders and 
judgments especially from other arms…”66 Consequently, the court 
will be rendered helpless as no sufficient remedy could be granted 
to the other party thereby reducing it to a toothless bull dog that can 
only bark but cannot bite.67 So many cases abound which expose 
the inadequacy of the role of the courts to ensure compliance with 
constitutional requirements for impeachment due to lack of respect 
for court order in impeachment proceedings. For, instance, the 
63 (2017) 6 NWLR (pt. 1562) 347.
64 (Supra).
65  Ibhade Nigeria Ltd v Akware (2015) 13 NWLR (1477) 507.
66 Onyesi chukwudi kingsley “Knitting Contempt of the Law to the Administration 
of Justice in Nigeria: No Longer at Ease”, available at https//:www.researchgate.
net/publication/317640076 (accessed on 12 August, 2017). 
67 Danladi vs. Dangiri (supra).
20
UUMJLS 10(1) Jan 2019 (1-24)
court order issued during the impeachment of Murtala Nyako as the 
Governor of Adamawa state that he be personally served with the 
impeachment notice as required by the constitution was flagrantly 
not complied with. In fact, the House of Assembly not only refused 
to comply but its Speaker justified the refusal in his words:
 
The issue of impeachment is constitutional responsibility 
of the lawmakers and the House of Assembly will not 
allow the judiciary to intervene in it because there is no 
going back over the impeachment exercise which the 
court lack the constitutional power to intervene.68
Similar scenarios played out in the impeachment of Garba Gadi, 
Deputy Governor of Bauchi State;69 impeachment of Rasheed 
Ladoja, Governor of Oyo State;70 impeachment of Peter Obi, 
Governor of Anambra State71 and that of Joshua Dariye, Governor 
of Plateau State.72 In all these cases impeachments were conducted 
in defiance to an issued or anticipated court order. Consequently, the 
courts were rendered helpless as such they had to wait until after the 
exercise had been concluded before they could review compliance 
or otherwise.
CONCLUSION
In the light of the preceding discussions, it is found that the role played 
by the courts is grossly inadequate and cannot ensure compliance with 
the constitutional requirements for impeachment. This is because no 
any specific role is conferred on the courts apart from the general and 
inherent role of judicial review of impeachment which only comes 
after the exercise had been concluded.  This is a serious limitation 
which exposes the inadequacy of the courts to ensure compliance. 
It is recommended that sections 143 and 188 of the constitution be 
amended to confer specific role on the Supreme Court to ensure that 
all the constitutional requirements for impeachment have been duly 
68 “Nyako: No court can Stop us- Adamawa law makers”, African Spotlight 
Newspaper, June 30, 2014, available at africanspotlight.com (accessed on 
February 12, 2017).
69 Gadi v Male (2010) 7 NWLR (pt. 1193) 238.
70  Inakoju v Adeleke (2007) LPELR 10354.
71  Balonwu v Obi (2007) 5 NWLR (pt. 1028) 488 C.A. Dapialong v Dariye 
(2007) LPELR-SC.39/2007.
72  Dapialong v Dariye (2007) LPELR-SC.39/2007.
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complied with by the legislature before a public officer is removed 
through impeachment.  The requirements under some constitutions 
across the globe is that a Constitutional Court, Supreme Court or any 
other special court or tribunal is saddled with the role of ensuring 
compliance by the legislature. Thus, this is the requirement under 
the constitutions of countries such as South Korea,73Uganda,74 
Trinidad and Tobago,75 Sri Lanka,76 South Sudan,77 Somalia,78 Slovenia,79 
Singapore,80 Sierra Leone,81 Seychelles,82 Rwanda,83 Russian Federation,84 
Romania,85 Angola,86 Armenia,87 Guyana,88 Croatia,89 Cyprus,90 Dominica,91 East 
Timor,92 Egypt,93 the Gambia,94 Germany,95 Hungary,96 Indonesia,97 Kazakhstan,98 
73 Article 65 of the constitution of the Republic of South Korea; Soon-yang Kim, 
�The Veto Point Politics of the Presidential �mpeachment in South Korea’ 
(2012) 39 The Korean Social Science Journal, 35; Justin Mccurry (2017) “Park 
Geun-hye: South Korean Court removes President over Scandal”, The Guard-
ian, March 10, 2017 available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/
mar/10/south-korea-president-park-geun-hye-constitutional-court-impeach-
ment (accessed on March 1, 201�. Matt Stiles (2017) “South Korea’s presi-
dent is removed from office as court upholds her impeachment”, Los Angeles 
Times, March 9, 2017, available at http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-
south-korea-park-impeach-2017-story.html (accessed on February 2, 2018). 
74 Article 107 of the constitution of Uganda, 2010.
75 section 36 of the constitution of Trinidad and Tobago, 1976.
76 Article 38 of the constitution of Sri Lanka, 1978.
77 Article 103 of the constitution of South Sudan, 2011.
78 Article 92 of the constitution of Somalia, 2012.
79 Article 109 of the constitution of Slovenia, 1991.
80 Article 22 of the constitution of Singapore, 1963.
81 section 51 of the constitution of Sierra Leon, 1991.
82 Article 53 of the constitution of Seychelles, 1993.
83 Article 105 of the constitution of Rwanda, 2003.
84 Article 93 of the constitution of Russian Federation, 1993.
85 Article 96 of the constitution of Romania, 1991.
86 Article 129 of the constitution of Angola, 2010.
87 Article 57 of the constitution of Armenia, 1995.
88 Article 180 of the constitution of Guyana, 1980.
89 Article 105 of the constitution of Croatia, 1992.
90 Article 45 of the constitution of Cyprus, 1960.
91 section 25 of the constitution of Dominica, 1984.
92 Article 79 of the constitution of East Timor, 2002.
93 Article 159 of the constitution of Egypt, 2014.
94 Section 67 of the constitution of the Gambia, 1996.
95 Article 61 of the constitution of Germany, 1949.
96 Article 13 of the constitution of Hungary, 2011.
97 Article 7 of the constitution of Indonesia, 1949.
98 Article 47 of the constitution of Kazakhstan 1995.
Kosovo,99 Madagascar,100 Mauritius101 and Moldova.102
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